Proceedings of the 53rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2020

Facing the Artificial:
Understanding Affinity, Trustworthiness, and Preference for More Realistic
Digital Humans
Mike Seymour
University of Sydney
mike.seymour@sydney.edu.au

Lingyao Yuan
Iowa State University
lyuan@iastate.edu

Alan R. Dennis
Indiana University
ardennis@indiana.edu

Kai Riemer
University of Sydney
kai.riemer@sydney.edu.au

Abstract
In recent years, companies have been developing
more realistic looking human faces for digital, virtual
agents controlled by artificial intelligence (AI). But
how do users feel about interacting with such virtual
agents? We used a controlled lab experiment to
examine users’ perceived trustworthiness, affinity,
and preference towards a real human travel agent
appearing via video (i.e., Skype) as well as in the form
of a very human-realistic avatar; half of the
participants were (deceptively) told the avatar was a
virtual agent controlled by AI while the other half were
told the avatar was controlled by the same human
travel agent. Results show that participants rated the
video human agent more trustworthy, had more
affinity for him, and preferred him to both avatar
versions. Users who believed the avatar was a virtual
agent controlled by AI reported the same level of
affinity, trustworthiness, and preferences towards the
agent as those who believed it was controlled by a
human. Thus, use of a realistic digital avatar lowered
affinity, trustworthiness, and preferences, but how the
avatar was controlled (by human or machine) had no
effect. The conclusion is that improved visual fidelity
alone makes a significant positive difference and that
users are not averse to advanced AI simulating human
presence, some may even be anticipating such an
advanced technology.

1. Introduction
In recent years, there has been significant growth
in the use of digital, virtual agents controlled by
artificial intelligence (AI). Voice-controlled virtual
agents are popular in a wide range of consumer
products. Nearly half of U.S. adults (46%) say they
now use these applications to interact with
smartphones and other devices [33]. Apple’s agent Siri

and Amazon’s Alexa1 are commercial products that
blur the line between humans and virtual agents. As a
result, the distinction between human agents and
virtual agents is growing smaller every year [34].
Newer virtual agents are beginning to take visual
form in the online world, with realistic, interactive,
fully rendered human faces that cross the “uncanny
valley”. This theory is widely known for capturing the
phenomenon of “eeriness”.
A disembodied voice as the representation of the
assistant is being expanded to include a more human
realistic face with a goal of achieving Realistic Visual
Presence (RVP). This is the sensation of human-like
presence obtained from interacting with a digital
human entity [32]. There has been a steady move
towards creating characters and avatars that are more
and more visually realistic [33]. The development of
RVP is an important area of research as humans are
hard wired to respond to human faces in unique and
positive ways [20]. Artificial human faces hold great
promise for advancing human-computer interaction
(HCI) and increasing affinity between humans and
their machines [35]. Similarly, few would argue that
the misuse of such digital human technology could
also lead to an abuse of trust and negative impacts.
We need to understand how users react to new
human-like digital entities at the heart of the creation
of RVP. So-called cognitive agents with natural faces
will likely make their way into real-life contexts.
Questions will arise regarding both the ability and
desirability of such agents to build relationships with
users over time, and the impact that these digital
humans will have on our professional and social
identities. For example, affinity and trust in digital
human entities are important factors that influence
whether consumers purchase from online retailers [7].
We distinguish between avatars directed by
humans, and agents directed by artificial intelligence.
We define a realistic digital avatar (or digital avatar),
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as “an avatar with the realistic, interactive facial
representation of the human actor puppeting it” [32].
A visually rich cognitive agent (or digital agent), is
defined as an AI-driven entity “visually presented as
an interactive, real-time rendered human-like entity,
on a screen or in a virtual environment” [32].
Past research suggests that when people believe
that digital human entities are driven by a real person,
they are seen as engaging [34]. The question thus
arises, what if they were driven by a similarly
emotionally engaging advanced AI engine, would they
be seen as similarly engaging? In prior research users
speculated that they would find an advanced digital
agent with a realistic human face to be “creepy”,
“spooky”, or “too much” [34], i.e. that the known
simulation of advanced human presence would itself
be off-putting. If proven true, this would undermine
any assumptions that the path to affinity with digital
humans can be achieved with improved visuals and
simulated realistic interaction. If fully natural realistic
responses from an AI were to be inherently
unwelcome by users, it would have profound negative
implications for the research and practitioner
community seeking to build more life-like agents.
Such a finding would suggest deliberately stylized
human forms may be a better way forward.
In this paper, we compare users’ reactions to
working with a real human agent using video (similar
to Skype) to their reactions to working with a digital
human entity controlled by either the same human
(digital avatar) or what they believed to be AI (digital
agent) when the digital agent was actually puppeted by
the same human, with the participants deceived into
believing it was controlled by AI in a “Wizard of Oz”style setting. This study thus asks two questions:
RQ1: Are there differences in user perceptions of
trustworthiness, affinity and preferences for human
actors and visually realistic digital human entities?
RQ2: Are there differences in user perceptions of
trustworthiness, affinity and preferences for digital
avatars (controlled by humans) and digital agents
(controlled by AI)?
Our results show participants’ affinity, trust, and
preference were strongly influenced by the visual
(Skype or avatar) but not by whether the avatar was
controlled by a human or AI. This has both theoretical
and practical implications. The first theoretical
implication is that reactions were more strongly
influenced by subconscious visual aspects of the
“person” than by the content of the interaction. We
have long theorized that behavior is central to trustbuilding but our results challenge this by indicating
that visual appearance trumps behavior. A second
implication is the lack of difference between human

and AI control: theory suggests that humans are more
capable of benevolence and integrity than machines,
yet the AI agent was no less trustworthy. Thus these
assumptions are unfounded or benevolence and
integrity are unimportant in this context.
The first implication for practice is that
improvements to human simulated behaviours is
important and will not inherently adversely influence
user. The second implication is that to improve
responses toward digital humans, work is still needed
in developing further their visual appearance, as the
same behaviour was found to be less effective when
exhibited by an entity with artificial appearance.
The paper is divided in a brief discussion of the
theoretical background of this work, our methodology
for exploring the research questions, the results,
discussion and conclusions.

2. Theoretical Background
In this study, we are interested in three theoretically
distinct types of interaction (see Table 1). The first is
a human agent who interacts with participants over
computer-mediated video; we call this the Video
Human (VH) treatment. The second is a human agent
who interacts with participants using a digital avatar;
we call this the Avatar Human (AH) treatment. The
third is an AI-controlled digital agent which presents
to participants with the same digital face as the digital
avatar; we call this the AI Agent (AA) treatment. We
informed the participants in our study that the AA was
controlled by IBM Watson (since it recently had been
in the news and was known to our participants), even
though it was puppeted by the same human as in the
other two treatments.

2.1 Prior Research
Digital agents have been the focus of research by many
IS scholars. Developing the algorithms that drive
digital agents is an important area of research, but it is
equally important to understand users’ behavior,
decision making processes, and attitudes towards
those agents [43, 3]. After all, even the best advice
provided by a digital agent is useless unless the
humans using the agent are willing to accept its advice.
This research shows that consumers’ beliefs, attitudes,
perceptions and behaviors are influenced by the
representation or display of the agent or an object,
especially if it triggers anthropomorphizing – a in
which users ascribe human-like characteristics to the
agent [23, 44, 45, 13, 11, 1].
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Table 1. The Three Conditions in the Study
Condition
Name Definition
Video Human VH
A human agent interacting via video
A human agent interacting via a digital
Avatar Human AH
avatar.
An AI-controlled digital agent entity with
AI Agent
AA
no human involvement in the interaction.
One way to trigger anthropomorphizing is by
adding a face to a virtual agent [44, 45]. Digital human
entities with more human-like faces are beginning to
appear in certain high-end applications and research.
For example, BabyX is a virtual agent which presents
as a young child [29]. BabyX is based on a selflearning neural brain model. 'She' works using
biologically based computational behavioral models
that determine ‘her’ baby-like behavior [12]. BabyX
uses a psychobiological modeling framework called
'Brain Language' (BL) to create an autonomous virtual
agent with a human realistic face and facial motion.
BabyX's autonomous expressive behavior is driven by
various neural-system models based on affective and
cognitive neuroscience theories. As a result, she
resembles an 'unscripted agent', in that her responses
are constructed in the moment, using the latest theories
in childhood neuroscience [29].
The BL was designed to support a wide range of
computational neuroscience models, as documented in
[38]. These models are integrated into a consistent
system of responses that range from simple leaky
integrators to spiking neurons to mean field models to
self-organizing maps. The BL is deployed within the
infrastructure designed to support it, using larger
neural networks (such as convolutional networks like
those used in deep learning and recurrent networks).
This allows a BL coded agent to simulated emotional
responses that can provide plausible facsimiles of
emotional intelligence, without actually replicating
emotional or rational thinking.
BabyX is one of the most well-known human-like
digital agents. Other highly realistic digital agents that
build on BabyX, include Rachel, Nadia and Roman,
each of which are driven by forms of AI that engages
in natural language conversation, and emotional
intelligence [33]. They do this using BL coupled with
natural language understanding (NLU) and natural
language generation (NGL), in a limited domain
space.
Other examples of agents with human like facial
representations include the growing class of virtual
influencers such as Lil Miquela, Blawko and Bermuda
[36]. Although these digital humans are most often not
interactive.
Research has shown that when presented with two
human-controlled digital avatars, one highly realistic

As Presented in the Study
A human agent on a Skype-like video call
A human agent represented by a digital
avatar visually resembling the human agent.
An IBM Watson AI-controlled digital agent
visually resembling the human agent.

and the other a cartoon character, people rated the
realistic avatar as more trustworthy, had more affinity
for it and equally preferred it as a virtual agent.
However, the same study questioned if our acceptance
of these highly realistic human face representations
may be moderated by who is perceived to be
controlling the entity, a human or an AI [34].

2.2. Self-categorization Theory
Self-categorization theory argues that individuals
automatically categorize the other either as in-group or
out-group members during social interactions [39].
They tend to trust and favor in-group members over
out-group members. Attitude, perceptions, and
emotions are easier to be shared among in-group
members than out-group members [39].
This same in-group/out-group process also
applies to digital characters. Prior research found that
individuals playing video games are more likely to
attribute in-group digital characters with the same
emotional state than out-group ones [4]. Likewise,
they also tended to mimic the emotion from their ingroup digital characters. Thus, individuals are prone to
anthropomorphizing digital entities with human-like
features [24].
Research suggests that users may see a humancontrolled digital avatar either as a direct extension of
the user controlling it or as a separate and distinct
entity [31]. At the heart of the experience is the issue
of agency and whose identity the observers believed
they are experiencing. While the avatars are a mix of
realism of their driving participants, they also exist
simultaneously as fantastical representations, being
able to look and act differently than the person
controlling them. This is the same process that occurs
when we see ventriloquist interacting with a dummy;
we know the dummy is being controlled by the
ventriloquist, but part of us ascribes the dummy with
agency separate from the ventriloquist.
We theorize that self-categorization theory may
be related to affinity with the digital humans and
affected by their perception of identity. This would
extend the notion of affinity with a digital human to be
seen as the key factor extending beyond aesthetics and
directly influencing trustworthiness.
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2.3. Affinity and the Uncanny Valley
The almost 50-year-old Uncanny Valley theory
[22] plays a key role in research on users’ reactions to
avatars and agents. The theory argues that users have
greater affinity for avatars that are more realistic. User
affinity increases as the avatar becomes increasingly
realistic, until the avatar is close to being realistic, at
which point affinity drops dramatically because a
semi-realistic avatar triggers unease in users. See
Figure 1. As realism increases, there comes a point
where the valley has been crossed and the avatar’s
affinity increases to its highest level. It does not
require the realistic avatar to be imperceptibly real,
just very close. Thus, “crossing the Uncanny Valley”
has attracted much research and commercial attention.

Figure 1. The Uncanny Valley
The Uncanny Valley uses the concept of
“affinity”, which comes from an original Japanese
word, Shinwakan (親和感), and is open to
interpretation as to how it is translated into English.
“Affinity” has emerged as the preferred translation
[42, 22]. Affinity is an indicator of whether an avatar
is in the Uncanny Valley.
The cause(s) of the Uncanny Valley are not clear,
but there are many different theories (see [42] for a
summary). Three theories are particularly relevant for
our research. The first theory argues that the drop in
affinity in the uncanny valley is due to perceptual
surprise [22, 30]. In the first 100-300ms after seeing
what could be a face, our subconscious initially
concludes that the almost-human avatar is a human
and creates an expectation of its humanity. It then
directs our conscious attention to focus on it. Our
conscious attention is surprised when it determines
that the avatar is actually not a human and this surprise
triggers a negative emotion.
A second theory argues that we perceive the
almost-human avatar to be human, but its less than

perfect features lead us to dehumanize it [42].
Dehumanization is the process whereby we perceive a
human to lack the attributes that comprise what it
means to be a human. It occurs when we see a person
as a member of an out-group that is different from the
in-group of people like ourselves; they become
animals (less intelligent) or machines (lacking
emotions) [41, 9]. In either case, this dehumanization
triggers negative emotions.
A third theory is based on evolution and argues
that our responses to almost-human avatars are
subconscious reactions for self-preservation [22]. We
perceive almost-human avatars to be humans
exhibiting a psychopathic personality disorder [37].
These almost-human avatars are perceived to be
callous and dishonest because they fail to accurately
display emotions and/or behave in the same way as
healthy humans.
A key point in all these theories is that they argue
that affinity for the avatar is not deliberate; the shared
conclusion is that affinity is driven by subconscious
processes that are beyond conscious control. The first
two theories are based on visual perceptions triggering
subconscious processes, so a static image is sufficient
to trigger our aversion. The third theory argues that
behavior that triggers aversion, so the avatar must be
interacting; a static image is not sufficient.
Empirical studies that have examined the
Uncanny Valley primarily have used static images or
scripted video clips; few have explicitly explored
interactivity [33], so, we have little understanding of
how users perceive interacting avatars, especially
those with highly realistic faces. A digital avatar with
a realistic face will be closer to a real human, but still
visually different. Users will still have greater affinity
for a human video than a digital avatar which looks
slightly less human-like, regardless of who or what is
controlling it. Thus:
Hypothesis 1a. Individuals will have greater
affinity for a human agent using video (VH) than
either a digital avatar or digital agent (AH and
AA).
Knowing the digital avatar is controlled by a
human, individuals will be consciously aware that the
avatar is just an extension or different form of another
human being. The consciousness, attitude, perception,
and behavior of the avatar can be explained using rules
applicable to humans. Individuals will be more likely
to categorize a digital avatar they believe to be
controlled by a real person as an in-group member (the
group of human) than a digital agent they believe is
controlled by an AI. Therefore, we theorize,
Hypothesis 1b. Individuals will have greater
affinity for a digital avatar controlled by a human
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(AH), than a digital agent controlled by artificial
intelligence (AA).

2.4. Trustworthiness
Trust is an individual’s willingness to be
vulnerable to the actions of the other for a particular
action, irrespective of the trustor’s ability to monitor
or control the trustee [17]. Trustworthiness is an
assessment of whether another person or thing is
worthy of trust [17]. Trust is between people [17], but
also applies to information systems [16, 40, 3, 12].
Mayer, et al. [17] argue that trust is a function of
the trustor’s disposition to trust and the trustor’s
assessment of the trustee’s ability, integrity, and
benevolence. Trust is refined through interaction [14,
17]. The trustor’s disposition to trust is independent of
the trustee; it is a “generalized attitude” learned from
experiences of fulfilled and unfulfilled promises [22,
27, 28], and varies from person to person.
The other three elements of trust are based on the
trustor’s assessment of the trustee [10, 17, 26]. Ability
refers to the skills that enable the trustee to be
competent within some specific domain. Ability is
key, because the trustor needs to know that the trustee
is capable of performing the task he or she is being
trusted to do. Integrity is the adherence to a set of
principles that the trustor finds acceptable. Integrity is
important because it indicates the extent to which the
trustee’s actions are likely to follow the trustee’s
espoused intentions. Benevolence is the extent to
which the trustee is believed to feel interpersonal care,
and the willingness to do good, aside from a profit
motive. Benevolence is important over the long term,
because it suggests that the trustee has some
attachment to the trustor, over and above the
transaction in which trust is being conferred.
Ability and integrity may be more important than
benevolence when the task is transaction-oriented
because the trustor just needs to have confidence that
the trustee has the ability to complete the transaction
[8]. For advice giving or recommendations,
benevolence may be more important because to
provide good advice and recommendations the trustee
must take into account the trustor’s best interests,
separate from a profit motive.
Benevolence and integrity are human
characteristics [8]. While we can think of machines as
having an ability to perform a task, they lack the
fundamental capability to adhere to principles
(integrity) or feel interpersonal care (benevolence).
Therefore, we theorize that humans are more likely to
be perceived as having integrity and benevolence than
non-human agents controlled by AI. Because integrity
and benevolence affect trustworthiness, we theorize

that human agents will be perceived as more
trustworthy than either digital avatar or agent. Thus:
Hypothesis 2a. Individuals will ascribe greater
trustworthiness to a human agent using video
(VH) than to a digital human entity, digital avatar
or agent (AA and AH).
People trust in-group members more than out
group members. Similar to affinity, we believe people
will more likely to categorize a human-controlled
avatar as an in-group than AI-controlled agents.
Therefore:
Hypothesis 2b. Individuals will ascribe greater
trustworthiness to a digital avatar controlled by a
human (AH) than a digital agent controlled by
artificial intelligence (AA).

2.5. User Preferences
Affinity and trustworthiness are two important
characteristics of virtual agents [7]. Affinity has often
been linked to increased preferences for interaction
with avatars and web sites in general [5, 7, 15].
Likewise, trustworthiness is an important factor
influencing both interpersonal preferences and
preferences for websites – and increased interactions
with both [8, 18]. We argued above that interaction
with a human would induce greater affinity
(Hypothesis 1a) and greater trustworthiness
(Hypothesis 2a) than interaction with a digital entity
of any sort. Taken together, we theorize that humans
should be preferred as agents. Thus:
Hypothesis 3a. Participants will prefer a human
agent using video (VH) to either digital avatar or
agent (AA and AH).
Avatars with human “mind” behind them will be
more likely categorized as a closer in group member.
People favor in-group members over out group
members, such attitude can be translated as higher
level of preferences in a self-report format. Therefore,
Hypothesis 3b. Individuals will prefer a digital
avatar controlled by a human (AH), to a digital
agent controlled by artificial intelligence (AA).

3. Method
We conducted a 2x2 repeated measures laboratory
experiment to test the hypotheses.

3.1. Participants
67 undergraduate students at a large university in
Australia participated in the experiments. Five
participants were excluded due to technical failures,
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resulting in a total sample of 62. About 60% of the
participants identified as female, 38% as male and one
identified as other. The average age was 23.6.
Subjects’ participation was voluntary; each participant
received a free movie ticket.

3.2. Task
The task participants performed was to use a travel
agent to get a quote for the airfare portion of an
overseas trip. Participants performed the same task
twice with different destinations: a trip from Sydney
to Los Angles, and a trip from Sydney to London. The
same script, with questions in the same order, was used
for both tasks in all treatments (e.g., first the travel
dates, then class of service, and so on).

facial tracking and live animation system that
responded in real-time and without noticeable latency.
The avatar was developed by a team comprised of the
researchers, professional video game animators
working in well-known technology firms, and
professional technical directors working for wellknown real time gaming companies. It matches
appropriately to industry standards. While not
indistinguishable from a real person, this model had
previously been used and been found to be trustworthy
in such a context [34].

3.3. Treatments
The within-subjects factor of the repeated
measures design was the agent type (human agent on
video (VH) vs. digital human entity) and the betweensubject factor was the type of digital entity, humancontrolled digital avatar (AH) vs. AI controlled digital
agent (AA). Thus every subject received the VH
treatment, and then either one of the AH or AA
treatments. Treatment order (human or digital first),
task order (Los Angles or London first), and the type
of digital entity (AH or AA), were randomly assigned.
The VH treatment was implemented using a video
application similar to Skype. The background and
environment was the same for all treatments. A neutral
nighttime background was placed behind the real actor
and the digital entities so their settings would not be a
factor. The video human agent and digital agent wore
the same style of clothing and were side lit (but for
technical reason from opposite sides). Their audio was
identical in quality and reproduction.
Participants were deceived into believing the AA
treatment used AI when in fact it did not. In both AH
and AA treatments they interacted with a digital avatar
controlled by the same person, who was also the
human agent in the VH treatment. In fact the only
treatment that participants received was a briefing that
either 1) rightly informed them that they were about to
interact with a real human (AH) via a digital avatar, or
2) deceptively told them that they were about to
interact with a digital agent controlled by AI (AA),
specifically IBM Watson.
The digital avatar used in the AH and AA
treatments was developed based on the image of the
same person as in the VH treatment (see Figure 2). It
needs to be noted that the creation of the 3D natural
digital human face of the avatar, to be puppeted in real
time, took considerable effort. The highly realistic
digital avatar was based on a custom-built, advanced

Figure 2. The video human agent (VH
treatment) above and RVP Avatar agent
(AH and AA treatments) below.
Photographs courtesy of the authors

3.4. Measurements
Measurements were adopted from prior research
and modified to assess the constructs of interest in this
study. The measures used in this study are summarized
in Table 1. All affinity and trustworthiness items were
measured using a 7-point Likert scale with 1
representing strongly disagree and 7 indicating
strongly agree. Measurements for both constructs were
reliable with Cronbach’s alpha higher than 0.70.
Participants were asked to indicate their preference for
a video human agent (VH) or the digital avatar/agent
(AH or AA). The question was 7-points anchored at
zero in the middle with 3s on the ends for strongly
prefer video agent and strongly prefer digital agent.
We converted the responses so that positive numbers
indicated a preference for the video human (VH).

3.5. Procedures
6
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The experimental procedure was the same for all
participants. After arriving at the laboratory, they
filled out a consent form, received instructions about
the procedure, including an explanation for the
treatments, and watched a short explanatory video.
They then performed one of the two travel tasks and
completed a short survey. This was repeated with the
second task and a second survey. They then moved to
a second room and had a recorded qualitative
interview, were debriefed, and received payment in the
form of a cinema voucher.
Table 1. Measurement Items for
Trustworthiness and Affinity
Reliability
Construct (Cronbach’s
Item
alpha)
I think the agent is
trustworthy.
0.85 Human I think the agent is
Trusthonest.
(VH)
worthiness
0.82 Avatar
I think the agent is
[25]
(AH and AA) dependable.
I think the agent is
competent.
The agent is
0.71 Human lifelike.
(VH)
The agent is
Affinity [2]
0.79 Avatar
friendly.
(AH and AA) I felt affinity with
the agent.

4. Results
Statistical analyses on trustworthiness, affinity,
preferences were completed in SPSS 23 using
repeated-measures general linear model (GLM). A
power analysis shows that our study has sufficient
power (.972) to detect medium effect sizes for within
subject tests and for the interaction between within and
between subject treatments.
Table 2 presents treatment means Participants
reported higher level of affinity for the video human
agent (VH) than the two RVP avatars (F(1,
58)=24.678, p<0.001); however, there was no
statistical difference between human-controlled avatar
(AH) or AI agent (AA) (F(1, 58)=1.348, p=0.250). The
order of the tasks (London or Los Angeles) had no
effects, neither within subject (F(1, 58)=0.263,
p=0.610) nor between subjects (F(1, 58)=0.606,
p=0.439). The order of the treatments has no within

subject effects (F(1, 58)=2.219, p=0.142) but between
subject effect (F(1, 58)=14.326, p<0.001). H1a is
supported but H1b is not.
Participants had more trust in the video human
(VH) than in the two digital treatments (F(1,
58)=22.229, p<0.001). There is no significant
differences on trust between participants who believed
that the avatar was controlled by human (HA) and
those who believed that they interacted with an AIcontrolled agent (AA) (F(1, 58)=1.270, p=0.264). The
order of the tasks has no within subject effect (F(1,
58)=0.310, p=0.580) or between subject effect (F(1,
58)=0.979, p=0.327). The order of treatments had no
within subject effect (F(1, 58)=0.020, p=0.823) but
between subjects effect (F(1, 58)=6.331, p=0.015).
H2a is supported but H2b is not.
We used t-tests to compare the preferences to
neutral (i.e., =0). We found participants in both
treatments to prefer the video Human (VH) to the
digital avatar/agent (AH: t(32)=5.43, p<.001; and AA:
t(28)=6.40, p<.001). There were no significant
differences in preferences towards the digital entity
when participants believed they interacted with an
avatar controlled by a human (AH) and those believed
they interacted with a digital agent controlled by AI
(AA) (F(1, 58)=0.318, p=0.575). Neither treatment
order (F(1, 58)=0.735, p=0.395) nor task destitution
city (F(1, 58)=0.814, p=0.371) had any effects on
preference. H3a is supported but H3b is not.
Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations
Affinity
Mean
Std.
Video Human (VH)
5.941
0.831
Avatar Human (AH)
5.273
1.298
Avatar AI (AA)
5.207
1.033
Trustworthiness
Mean
Std.
Video Human (VH)
6.113
0.842
Avatar Human (AH)
5.659
1.053
Avatar AI (AA)
5.491
1.034
Preference*
Mean
Std.
Video Human (VH)
na
na
Avatar Human (AH)
1.700
1.795
Avatar AI (AA)
1.930
1.624
* Positive numbers indicate a preference for the
Video Human (VH) over the AH or AA avatar

5. Discussion
Our results show that participants perceived the
video human agent (VH) to be more trustworthy and
had more affinity for him than either the digital avatar
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(AH) or the digital agent (AA). Likewise, participants
preferred the human agent (VH) to either the digital
avatar (AH) or agent (AA).
Humans are hard wired to interpret human faces.
Our brains can read faces with far more fidelity than
any other object. Evolution has left us with the ability
to quickly identify and reject artificial faces which are
only approximately close to realistic [19]. Perhaps it is
not surprising then, that our participants preferred
human agents using video (e.g., Skype) to both kinds
of digital face representation, as indicated in the
Uncanny Valley Theory.
More interestingly, there were no differences in
affinity, trustworthiness or preference between the
digital avatar controlled by a human (AH) and the
digital agent controlled by AI (AA). We would have
expected that people develop aversion to a purely
digital entity once they know that it is controlled by
AI, and as a result trust it less, and categorize it as far
less similar to themselves. However, our results show
that once the AI achieves the same level of realism in
behavior as human controlled interaction, they are
likely to be perceived as the same as humans, even
though our participants believed they were AI
controlled digital agents.
As a reminder, the digital face utilized was a
technology artifact designed to induce a perception of
humanness and controlled in both instances by a
human. We instructed half of our participants that the
face was puppeted by the same person present in the
video conversation yet deceived the other half into
believing that it was controlled by an AI. Hence, since
participants were consciously aware of who or what
was controlling the digital face, we reasoned that this
knowledge would make a difference in that the avatar
controlled by a human would likely be perceived as an
in-group member and therefore be more trustworthy
than a digital, non-human agent controlled by AI.
Based on prior research, we reasoned that an AI with
human-like abilities would make our participants less
comfortable than the avatar controlled by a human.
However, our results did not support this.
Why then were our participants not thrown off by
a fully digital entity that exhibits traits of general
intelligence and a level of conversational proficiency
out of reach of the current state of technology? One
clue was given in our exit interviews. After completing
the study, participants were interviewed about their
experiences. One question was to make sure that they
had accurately understood the treatment they were in,
whether AH or AA. About 90% of the participants (56
out of 62) correctly understood which treatment they
had received. However, six of the AH participants,
who were clearly briefed that the digital face was
driven by a real human, nonetheless reported that they

believed (wrongly) that they had interacted with an
agent controlled by AI. We compared the affinity,
trustworthiness, and preferences of these six
participants to the others in the AH treatment and
found no significant or meaningful differences.
We reason that those six participants might have
assumed a unity in the entity that they interacted with;
because the face was artificial, they extrapolated
subconsciously that the controlling entity must also be
artificial. Alternatively, they might not have been able
to envision how a digital face could be puppeted by a
human. In either case, what is significant about this
observation is how ready the cohort of participants
was to believe in the existence of general AI, at a level
that is beyond current capability. We argue that it is
this deep-rooted belief in the power of technology that
is at the heart of the above finding; namely that the AA
treatment did not lead to negative perceptions that
would have it rendered different to the AH treatment.
This observation opens up an interesting new
stream of research to investigate how personal, and
collective, attitudes towards technological progress in
general and AI in particular, might influence people’s
readiness for engagement with new digital human
technologies, in different ways. It may be that young
adults who have grown up in a technology-rich world
might have different responses than older adults who
remember a time when technology was not so
ubiquitous and powerful. We would expect differences
to exist among different age groups and among people
with different technology backgrounds. We propose
future studies should both investigate attitudes
towards AI and experimental research on digital
humans taking into account such potential differences.
Studies like ours suffer from the common
limitations of lab experiments with undergraduate
students working on artificial tasks. Student samples
are considered to be an appropriate for testing theories
about phenomena that expected to hold true across the
general population [6], and there is evidence that
students have an equal exposure to avatars as general
population in real life. The task was artificial in that
participants were not required to actually pay for the
inquired trip to the destination cities; there were no
consequences to planning the trips.
Our study has several implications. First, users
have more affinity for and trust in humans interacting
over video and prefer them to digital avatars controlled
by humans (or by AI). For services provided via
interpersonal interaction, people still prefer real
humans. Companies should still consider using human
agents for such tasks. Second, participants in our
study, a young and well-educated cohort of people, did
not prefer or trust avatars controlled by humans more
than digital agents controlled by AI, as long as AI
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controlled agents are implemented on the same level
of perceived intelligence. However, this may be
tempered to some extent by the application.
Companies who plan to use AI controlled agents
should focus on creating digital representations that
“feel as if” they are driven by real humans. The design
and the findings of this research can be used by real
companies and provide opportunities to observe
consumers’ behaviors in real life and produce
generalizable findings.

6. Conclusion
The development and use of digital avatars and
AI-based digital agents has been the interest of
multiple disciplines and industry alike. Our goal was
to contribute to the body of knowledge on this topic by
directly comparing individuals’ trustworthiness,
affinity, and preference for human agents and digital
counterparts (whether human controlled or AI-based).
This study provides some initial evidence in
understanding individual perceptions of digital avatars
and agents.
Understanding individual perceptions is difficult
and complex. What we found was that visual aspects
were more important than the behaviour in driving
user perception. One implication is that although
research on AI agents to improve their behaviour is
important, the development of human-realistic faces is
also important. If we expect users to trust and have
affinity for the AI agents they work with, visual
appearance is critical. Even the highest performing AI
agent will not engender high levels of trust, affinity,
and preference to use unless the AI agent looks the
part. Development of appearance, especially of the
digital face, is essential because human perception is
not only rational and influenced by behaviour, but is
strongly – perhaps even more strongly – influenced by
visual appearance.
The research shows that in terms of the visuals
alone, while the level of realism between the artificial
and the actual seems subtle and involving only small
differences, those differences are important, and
additional improvements in realism would have a
significant effect.
We expect our research to contribute to the
practical challenges of producing more useful digital
humans, as practitioners spend millions of dollars to
push digital agent technologies forward, while
companies make deployment decisions, and users
begin to encounter such entities “in the wild”.
Our research is just one step in the process of
refining our understanding of human perception,
attitude, behavior, and decision making in this context.
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